Practice What You Preach
It's time to move the security pulpit from the workplace to your living room
BY SIMSON GARFINKEL
Do you spend time and money developing your organization's disaster recovery plan, while failing to back up your home PC?
Do you invest in
guards and security cameras for the office, and then leave confidential
papers on your desk while you step out for a sandwich?
Do you set up your desktop's antivirus system to automatically download new virus
definition files every day, while allowing your home PC's antivirus
system to expire because you didn't want to pay $50 when the trial
version ran out?
The most
conscientious security professionals that I know practice what they
preach. They have shredders in their kitchens for those incessant
credit card offers. They alarm their homes. They turn on wired
equivalent privacy (WEP) encryption
on their home wireless networks. And they password-protect the
photographs on their personal website. You have to live it, they say.
Otherwise, you aren't worth your salt.
Likewise some
CSOs are genuinely concerned about their own security and privacy. They
know that an extremely effective way to target an organization is by
targeting the homes or personal lives of its directors. In this case,
surveillance can be done without breaking the law.
Consider the 1988 U.S. Supreme Court case of California v. Greenwood,
in which the court ruled that Americans have no right to the privacy of
their trash. Billy Greenwood was a man whom the local police suspected
of dealing drugs, but they didn't have any proof. So the police
acquired Greenwood's trash from the collectors who picked it up from
the curb, and then went through the bags with a fine-tooth comb looking
for evidence. They found it. The evidence was used to obtain a search
warrant for Greenwood's home. Drugs were found in the home, and
Greenwood was arrested and eventually convicted on felony drug charges.
Greenwood appealed, arguing that the original, warrantless searches of
his trash had been unconstitutional search and seizure.
The court
disagreed. "It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left along
a public street are readily accessible to animals, children,
scavengers, snoops and other members of the public," wrote Justice
Byron White, delivering the opinion of the court. "Moreover,
respondents placed their refuse at the curb for the express purpose of
conveying it to a third party, the trash collector, who might himself
have sorted through it or permitted others, such as the police, to do
so. The police cannot reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from
evidence of criminal activity that could have been observed by any
member of the public."
The Greenwood
case should be a reminder to all executives that there is no legal
protection for materials that are thrown into the trash. Yet time and
time again, I have seen business travelers rip up documents that they
had been reading and stuff them into trash cans at United Airlines' Red
Carpet club and other similar locations. Although it might be somewhat
embarrassing for United, it would be perfectly legal for one of the
club's employees to take the documents out of the trash, piece them
back together, and either publish them on the Internet or sell them to
another organization. (Someone should also remind these executives not
to yell into their cell phones about confidential matters, but I
digress.)
Of course, if the
bad guys are willing to break the law, things can get much worse.
Business leaders in countries where kidnapping is a fact of life know
this very clearly. But in the United States and much of Europe,
executives are, at times, blissfully naive. I know many executives who
are astonished when they realize that they are personally targeted by
their corporate enemies. In one case, a CEO's laptop was stolen out of
his briefcase when he got up from his seat to give the opening keynote
at a conference. Even though the room was packed, nobody noticed the
thief walking out with the executive's booty.
Classified Storage
One of the most famous cases of poor home practices jeopardizing
the security of an organization is the case of John Deutch, an MIT
professor who served as President Clinton's director of central
intelligence from May 10, 1995, until Dec. 14, 1996. Several days after
Deutch left office, high-level classified information was discovered on
a government-owned computer located in Deutch's house in Bethesda, Md.
Deutch held a security clearance, of course, but the computer was not
approved for the storage of classified information.
According to a
government report, the resulting investigation found that Deutch had
stored high-level classified information on at least "five
government-owned Macintosh computers, configured for unclassified
purposes, to process classified information. At least four of these
computers were connected to modems that were lacking cryptographic
devices and linked to the Internet, a DoD electronic mail server and/or
(bank) computers. As a result, classified information residing on
Deutch's computers was vulnerable to possible electronic access and
exploitation."
Most home computer users I know are completely flummoxed at the
prospect of backing up their home systems and laptops. Help them!
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One of the e-mail messages that Deutch received on
these computers during his time as intelligence director, the report
states, apparently came from a Russian colleague. Of course, e-mail can
also deliver Trojan horse programs that seek out confidential
information. Cookies found on the computer's Web browsers indicated
that the computers had visited websites considered "risky."
But this wasn't
all. Deutch, unlike former directors, had refused to have a 24-hour
guard in his house because he wanted to preserve his privacy. As a
compromise, the CIA and local police drove by his house on a regular
basis and installed a residential security system that included an
alarm on his study's closet, which contained a safe. But Deutch,
without the agency's permission, gave the alarm's code to his resident
alien maid, who didn't have a security clearance. "Deutch said that he
thought his residence was secure," the report said. "In hindsight, he
said that belief was not well founded."
The report notes
that Deutch could have been fined or imprisoned for up to 10 years or
both for his careless handling of classified information. Instead, he
was pardoned by President Clinton.
Home security
isn't just a problem for governments trying to secure classified
information; it's important for businesses trying to secure their
internal networks. Remember back in October 2000 when Microsoft
announced that its corporate network had been penetrated by hackers?
It's now widely believed that the program responsible for the attack,
Troj.Qaz.A, was delivered to the home machine of a Microsoft employee
in an e-mail message, and then gained access to Microsoft's internal
network over a VPN connection. Such an attack could be delivered
equally well over a laptop computer that traveled from one side of a
company's firewall to the other.
Backups are
another big problem. These days, most organizations seem to back up
their servers and hope that their employees don't store the only copy
of important files on their company desktops. But what about that
mobile executive who spends three weeks working on a few PowerPoint
presentations and an accompanying Excel spreadsheet: Is that
information backed up? Many times the answer is no. This is an
especially big issue when important projects are due after the holidays.
Secure Home Machines
So what's a CSO to do? You can start by making sure that your home
machine—as well as your organization's employees' machines—are as
secure as the machines at work. When you negotiate your antivirus
contracts, purchase extra copies for people's home computers. Even if
you have a centrally managed firewall,
license host-based firewalls for laptops and home computers. Even if
you are a Windows-only shop, be sure that you license Mac products for
those 5 percent of your users who have Apples at home.
If you haven't
already, make sure everybody in your organization has easy access to a
decent crosscut shredder. Next, institute a program for shredding every
piece of paper your company generates that contains the name of your
company, a customer or a business partner. This is a simple rule that's
easy to implement and easy to audit. But the real value comes from the
awareness training that the program instills: Once your users are
hooked on shredding, set up a program that allows them to purchase
shredders for their homes at a deep discount.
Most home
computer users I know are completely flummoxed at the prospect of
backing up their home systems and laptops. Help them! These days there
are a number of very good backup solutions for home users—including
network-based backup providers, home servers with automatic backup and
even USB hard drives with a big "backup" button. You may bristle at the
thought of backing up Junior's collection of pirated MP3s, but you need
to have some way of making sure that company work products on home
machines don't get lost when Junior needs more room. Don't be so
foolish as to think that you can keep your files off employee's home
machines; even with the threat of 10 years in a federal penitentiary,
the CIA wasn't able to get an MIT professor who should have known
better to follow the rules.
Simson Garfinkel, CISSP, is a technology writer who is based in the Boston area. He can be reached at machineshop@cxo.com.
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