Machine Shop
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| Antivirus: Great Business, Lost Cause
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| The Edge |
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Signature-based scanning software ultimately can't keep up with the high-speed
proliferation of viruses and worms
BY SIMSON GARFINKEL
HERE'S A PARADOX: The business of antivirus software has never
been better. And yet the long-term prognosis in the antivirus battle
has never been more bleak.
This fall, the "National Strategy to
Secure Cyberspace" stated that all home and business users need to
install antivirus software on their computers and update their systems
on a regular basis. Most CSOs and CIOs—dare we say all of them?—by now
realize that it is irresponsible to deploy computers without antivirus
protection. Nevertheless, the war against computer viruses and their
authors is stumbling. Tens of thousands of computer viruses are in
circulation. Symantec's Security Response website reported 81 viruses
discovered during a 30-day period this fall. Academics who follow
viruses say that that figure understates the threat. "Currently we are
seeing new computer viruses and worms, targeted at [Microsoft Windows],
reported approximately once every 75 to 90 minutes, on average," wrote
Gene Spafford, computer science professor and director of Purdue
University's Education and Research in Information Assurance and
Security, in the 2003 AAAS Science and Technology Yearbook.
There's a key bit of information in Spafford's line—the bit about
Windows. Now this is not an anti-Microsoft rant; all operating systems
Diversity is going to be a necessary element of successful antivirus defense.
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years. But the reliance throughout corporate America on a single OS
means all of our eggs are in one basket. There's a solid argument to
make that in the long run, all the antivirus add-ons in the world won't
stem the tide of viruses and worms. Diversity is going to be a
necessary element of successful antivirus defense.
So Far, So Lucky
In the United States, the worms that have been the most successful
at propagating have inflicted comparatively little damage on their
inflicted hosts. The Melissa, I Love You, Nimda and Code Red worms
infected tens of millions of machines in a day and cost corporate
America more than a billion dollars in "lost productivity" (although
it's unproven that being without your e-mail for a day really
constitutes lost productivity). Aside from sending out a lot of e-mail
and clogging servers, though, those worms didn't fundamentally damage
the computers that were infected.
Compare that with what happened to
Korea on April 26, 1999, when more than 1 million computers had their
hard drives wiped and their system BIOS erased by the CIH/Chernobyl
virus. In many cases, damaged systems required new BIOS chips or
motherboards. Total losses were pegged at $250 million in hard dollars.
CIH/Chernobyl is no match for
today's signature-based antivirus systems. The typical virus scanner
has a database of signatures—unique byte strings—for roughly 50,000
viruses. On a properly protected computer, executables infected with a
familiar signature such as Chernobyl's simply can't run.
Signature-based antivirus software is also slowly making its way from
the desktop to the network, adding another layer of security.
But there is a serious failing with
signature-based systems that few people in the antivirus community
admit. Antivirus scanners do nothing to protect against the most
serious virus threat today: new viruses. By definition, a new virus
won't be in any existing database of viral signatures. Back when the
Melissa and I Love You worms hit, the only way that businesses could
protect themselves was to update their antivirus systems. At times this
meant updating every day—or even every hour—as new variants of these
viruses hit the network.
The Monoculture Problem
Unfortunately, even this won't be good enough in the near future. A
paper that was presented at this year's Usenix Security Symposium
convincingly showed several strategies for infecting between 1 million
and 10 million Internet hosts in 15 minutes or less. The paper is
titled "How to Own the Internet in Your Spare Time," by Stuart
Staniford at Silicon Defense, Vern Paxson at ICSI Center for Internet
Research and Nicholas Weaver at UC Berkeley. The authors' findings are
based on results they discovered with an Internet simulator that they
created for this purpose. (The full text of the paper can be found at www.cs.berkeley.edu/~nweaver/cdc.web.)
There are several workable infection
strategies, it turns out. One is to scan in advance for vulnerable
machines that are connected to high-bandwidth networks. Another
approach is to divide up the Internet's address space in an intelligent
manner so that each copy of the worm has the maximum chance of
infecting a virgin machine. Staniford and company call such worms
Warhol and Flash. It is impossible to protect against those worms with
signature-based antivirus systems: Before a worm could be analyzed and
a signature distributed, the damage would already be done.
If someone creates a worm that
combines the infection strategy outlined in the Staniford paper with a
Chernobyl-style payload, we are looking at a lot more damage than a few
days of lost productivity. MSN, HotMail, eBay and tens of thousands of
small and midsize businesses would all be shut down, and bringing those
companies back up might require getting new hardware, restoring systems
from backup tapes (assuming that backups exist) and finally, patching
the security flaws. Such repairs could take weeks; many companies would
fail.
Nevertheless, it's important to
realize that a Warhol or Flash worm would almost necessarily be
selective: such a worm would probably exploit just one or two
vulnerabilities known to the authors—vulnerabilities that were not
widely known, or at least not widely patched. The biggest bang for the
worm author, obviously, is going to come from targeting the single
largest platform: Microsoft Windows systems running on Intel-based
architectures.
I'm not arguing that Windows is a
fundamentally less secure OS than Unix—that's beside the point. All
systems have had significant security problems. Even OpenBSD, which
boasts just a single remote vulnerability in the past six years, was
susceptible to a flaw discovered this fall in the OpenSSL library
package. But because of architectural differences, every Unix computer
with the OpenSSL library would have had a slightly different exploit.
Windows systems, on the other hand, frequently have common exploits.
Those computers can rightly be thought of as a monoculture crop—with
all the strengths and weaknesses that a monoculture implies.
Much of American agribusiness has adopted monoculture farming in recent years: crops that are
Researchers are trying to build an "immune system" to attack any program that seems to be acting in a suspicious manner.
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simplified growing procedures and, as a result, generally increased
profits—even though the seeds usually cost more. American business and
government, likewise, is standardizing on the Microsoft monoculture to
decrease training and deployment costs—even though the software itself
costs more. But just as a single virus or fungus can wipe out an entire
field of genetically identical organisms, so too can a single computer
virus wipe out a network of identically configured Windows servers.
Palladium: Nice Try
Microsoft's Palladium initiative might be an approach to solving
the monoculture problem: In theory, if computers are gimmicked so that
they will run only cryptographically signed programs, then viruses
won't run because they won't be signed. I personally don't believe that
computer users will put up with such a system, but even if they did,
Palladium will not put an end to viruses unless every signed program is
itself bug-free. Otherwise, a clever hacker will always be able to
booby-trap the signed code with a data-driven attack. This isn't just
theory. There have already been several examples of bugs in digitally
signed ActiveX applets that could be used to propagate viruses and
other nasty programs.
Other researchers are trying to
build an "immune system" to protect modern operating systems against
viruses—such a system would monitor a computer's health and attack any
program that seems to be acting in a suspicious manner. But just as our
own immune system is susceptible to viruses such as AIDS, a monoculture
immune system would necessarily have its own Achilles' heel. Hackers
would find it and exploit it.
The best approach, to borrow
nature's own solution, is to stop deploying a monoculture crop on our
desktops and servers. Businesses and government should not standardize
on a single OS; instead, they should adopt a dual-source or multisource
approach—deploy both Windows and Unix.
Alas, that approach is clearly more expensive in the short run, but in the long run it is dramatically more secure.
Simson Garfinkel, CISSP, is a Boston-based technology writer, and he is also the CTO of Sandstorm Enterprises.
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