is one of the most enthusiastic supporters of Ronald Reagan's approach, his "huge arms buildup," his "tough anti-Soviet rhetoric," his "militarized diplomacy"? Last summer the hero of Gorky again took his life into his hands and sent a letter to Professor Sidney Drell of Stanford, published in *Foreign Affairs*, in which he wrote that the Soviets now possess a significant advantage in ICBMs, which the West must correct with the MX missile. He worried about the West's "lack of resolve," and characterized the peace movement as "pacifist." Mr. Sakharov's views are open to debate; even brave men may be wrong. We think that generally he is right. We are certain, moreover, that he can provide no comfort to the likes of Mr. Lewis.

□ ENTERTAINMENT FOR MEN: The July issue of *Playboy* magazine holds something even more unforgettable than Bo Derek's latest display of her acting ability. The interview this month is with Walid Jumblatt, "the Lebanese warlord who held off the Marines." The "enigmatic guerrilla, scholar, and self-avowed warlord" announces that he is "a Social Democrat" who "likes" the killing in Lebanon and finds it "interesting." Best of all, the Druse cutthroat reveals that when he came to New York he "wouldn't dare go" into the subways—too dangerous. The Big Apple cannot have received a better compliment in years. Still, from now on we're sticking to the pictures.

□ TWENTY YEARS AGO IN THE NEW REPUBLIC: "In a three-hour informal talk with a handful of correspondents, Castro remarked jauntily that anybody who now sought to destroy the Cuban revolution would have to commit the greatest act of genocide in the world's history, and he followed this up by saying that 'in normal conditions' (meaning the end of what he calls threats and provocations) he would be disposed to talk things over with the United States, but only on the guarantee of mutual respect for sovereignty and national rights. By this he obviously meant that it would have to be the United States, not he or Cuba, which would have to make concessions if a *rapprochement* were reached, and that such concessions would surely include the abandonment of the base at Guantanamo. He might, however, be prepared to cut his visible, physical ties with the Soviet Union in return for an accommodation with the United States. One shrewd diplomat confided to me that he already detected a mutual drawing apart by Cuba and the Russians. This was not due only to mutual disillusionment, but more perhaps to a decision by the Soviet Union to put on ice for the time being its plans for the political capture of Latin America while it carries forward its present policy of coming to limited terms with the United States. As for Castro, he was turning away because he did not wish to continue being utterly dependent upon his Communist partner, particularly for oil, and he now also wants to hasten consolidation by becoming acceptable to the non-Communist world." ("Cuba: Why Castro Is Feeling Stronger," by Edwin Tetlow, July 11, 1964.)

The origins of the 'blacklist.'

U.S.I.A. TODAY

ON MAY 15 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted to reject Leslie Lenkowsky as deputy director of the U.S. Information Agency—the first outright rejection of a Reagan nominee. Lenkowsky's credibility had been damaged in three committee hearings by charges that he lied about his knowledge of a so-called "blacklist" of liberals in the agency's overseas speaking program. Talking to reporters after the 11-to-6 vote, Senator Christopher Dodd declared that the American Participants program had become a "cesspool" fed by partisan and ideological effluents, and that this politicization threatened "the future and survival of the agency itself." But if politicization was the real problem, the committee should have focused its criticism not only on the Reagan Administration, but on its Democratic predecessor as well. Intended or not, it was under Jimmy Carter that the "cesspool" began to fester.

Upon taking office Carter proposed, as part of his governmental reorganization efforts, to subsume the State Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs under U.S.I.A. Similar merger proposals had been made—and defeated—periodically since the 1950s. Former Senator William Fulbright, who had long fought to keep politics out of government-sponsored educational programs, was one of many who strongly opposed the move. He argued in a 1977 Congressional hearing that whatever Administration was in power would be too easily tempted to use the programs as a platform for political propaganda. Carter tried to quell such fears by stating in his executive order, "The new Agency's activities . . . will not be given over to the advancement of the views of any one group, any one party, or any one administration. The Agency must not operate in a covert, manipulative, or propagandistic way."

But Carter's actions made it difficult to draw a line between policy and politics. Under the reorganization, a State Department program called American Specialists, which sponsored speaking tours for academics, was merged with a more culture-oriented U.S.I.A. program called Volunteer Speakers. If the combined program—American Participants, or AmParts in governmentese—had been placed in U.S.I.A.'s Department of Educational and Cultural Affairs, it would have been administered, according to the terms of the Fulbright-Hays Act, by a nonpartisan board of scholars. Instead, Carter approved of placing AmParts in the agency's Bureau of Programs, which is administered by the U.S.I.A. director, a political appointee, under the broad guidelines of the Smith-Mundt Act: "The Secretary [Director] is authorized when he finds it appropriate to provide for the preparation and dissemination abroad of information about the United States, its people and its policies." It is not surprising that

Charles Wick, the egregious director of U.S.I.A., and Leslie Lenkowsky, a neoconservative ideologue, took those guidelines and ran.

Still, the politicization of AmParts was first encouraged not by Reagan's appointees, but by Carter's reorganization. Despite Carter's 1978 executive order, the AmParts selection process involved a kind of political vetting. There was no weekly review process by political appointees as there would be under Reagan; the selection and approval of speakers were up to career officials. But notecards were kept on the qualifications and political inclinations of proposed participants. A yellow file box still used by program officers in the Latin America division, for example, contains cards from the Carter years with comments like, "anti-Carter" for one academic now serving on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "sounded pro-Administration" for Latin America specialist Patricia Fagen, and "considered conservative" for University of Virginia professor David Jordan. An invitation issued to Kenneth Adelman by a U.S.I.A. program officer to participate in a two-week speaking tour of Africa was subsequently withdrawn without explanation. Adelman, now the head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, believes that the decision to cancel the trip was made because of articles he had written in *Foreign Affairs* and TNR that were critical of Carter Administration policies in Africa.

THE REAGAN Administration formalized this review process for the AmParts program by establishing a list of proposed speakers, which was circulated each week among political appointees. The procedure began in the summer of 1981 after four American economists touring Japan courtesy of AmParts were reported in a U.S.I.A. cable to have been "uniform in their criticism of U.S. economic policies and skeptical of the effectiveness of supply-side economics. . . ." Upset by the news, U.S.I.A. Associate Director John Hughes ordered a weekly review to prevent future embarrassments. "What I need . . . is a list of those speakers who are ABOUT TO BE CHOSEN," Hughes wrote emphatically to Deputy Associate Director Gifford Malone in August 1981. "This will give me the opportunity to take a look at the list, do a little screening before commitments are made." As career officers saw the people rejected by Wick, Lenkowsky, Hughes, and other political appointees, they compiled the "blacklist," as it came to be known after *Washington Post* reporter Howard Kurtz wrote a story about it.

But the list was widely misunderstood. It was certainly not on the order of a McCarthy blacklist or a Nixon enemies list. Nor was it even a tool used by conservatives to keep liberals out of the overseas speaking program. According to U.S.I.A. officials familiar with the AmParts upheaval, it was a defensive move on the part of career officers who feared reprisal from political appointees if they proposed names that had already been rejected. The list reflected the judgment of career officers about the partisanship of the top U.S.I.A. appointees.

Other than the political backlash, the actual results of the "blacklist" and weekly review lists were not that much different from those of the Carter Administration's review process. In response to the charges of political malfeasance, a U.S.I.A. inspection team (composed of career officers, not political appointees) took a comparative sampling of about a fourth of all AmParts participants during two years: 1979 and 1983. It found that in 1979, under the Carter Administration, twenty-one AmParts participants were Democrats and six were Republicans. In 1983, under the Reagan Administration, twenty-one were Republicans and fourteen were Democrats. Even allowing for the errors of unscientific sampling, it seems clear that partisanship—to the degree partisanship can be identified—has been the rule in AmParts under Democratic and Republican Presidents alike. Moreover, in the two-and-a-half years the list of rejected speakers was in circulation, approximately 1,500 speakers traveled overseas on programs; only 95 names were on the list. The inspection team concluded that 38 of those were rejected for expressly political reasons.

Which is not to say that Congress should have overlooked the evidence, presented during the confirmation hearings, that Mr. Lenkowsky lied about when he learned of the "blacklist," and that he acquiesced in the shredding of copies of it. (In the only authentic example of Nixonian paranoia to be found in the scandal, U.S.I.A. General Counsel Thomas Harvey ordered the weekly review lists and copies of the "blacklist" destroyed after Warren Unna, a freelance journalist, and Howard Kurtz requested copies of them. Lenkowsky was alleged to have been present when this order was given.) Doubtless, the names revealed on surviving copies of the list—including Walter Cronkite, Gary Hart, and Coretta Scott King—gave the issue a certain notoriety. But Lenkowsky never said that political considerations had not influenced his choice of AmParts speakers—only that partisanship had not been his sole consideration. Whether Lenkowsky was telling the truth or not, the fact is that Carter's reorganization gave him ample room to act in a partisan fashion.

NOW CONGRESS is trying to figure out how to repair AmParts. If its portion of the U.S.I.A. budget is negligible (one-third of 1 percent), the philosophical question hovering over it is not: How should debate in American society be represented abroad? It could be reasonably argued that a government in power has every right to send abroad only speakers who support its policies. (A separate program that would sponsor "Presidential speakers" has been informally discussed at U.S.I.A.) But every Administration, Reagan's included, has expressed a desire for balance, if not objectivity, in overseas speakers programs. The best way to pursue balance is to make sure that the Administration isn't in charge of achieving it.

Congress should recall the long-standing debate over—and resistance to—politicization of overseas educational