


# Ensure Proper Data Management with Discarded IT Assets



**Simson L. Garfinkel**  
**Center for Research on Computation and Society**  
**Harvard University**  
**Thursday, November 3, 9:45am**

**Ten used computers were purchased in August 1998.**



**This is computer #1.**

## Computer #1 was a file server for a 15-attorney law firm.

### Contents:

- client documents
- billing records
- correspondence




### Computers #2 through #10 had:

- Mental health records
- Home finances
- Draft of a novel


**Was this a chance accident or common occurrence?**

# This talk explores the problem of data on discarded computers and presents real, practical solutions.

- Scale of the problem



- The Traceback Study



- Applicable Legislation



- Answers and Technology Choices



# Data confidentiality is an important business goal.

Data can be:

- In flight
- Stored



**Data spends most of its life in storage.  
Therefore, stored data must be protected.**

# There are three techniques for assuring data confidentiality.

1. Physical security.



2. Logical access controls. (operating system)

3. Cryptography (disk & link)





**When a disk is retired, techniques #1 and #2 don't work.**

1. ~~Physical security~~



2. ~~Logical access controls (operating system)~~

3. Cryptography (disk & link)



**Most organizations don't encrypt their stored data.**

# Hard drives pose special problem for computer security.

Do not forget data when power is removed.

Contain data that is not immediately visible.


Today's computers can read hard drives that are 15 years old!

- Electrically compatible (IDE/ATA)
- Logically compatible (FAT16/32 file systems)
- Very different from tape systems





**The problem: 210 million drives will be retired this year.**



**This is a staggering amount of data!**

**“Retire?”**



**Deckard (Harrison Ford) retiring a replicant.  
“Blade Runner” (1982)**

# Many “retired” hard drives are actually resold or repurposed.



Retired drives are:

- Re-used within organizations
- Given to charities
- Sold at auction


**All Categories** [Save this search](#)  
350 items found for hard drives  
Sort by items: [ending first](#) | [newly listed](#) | [lowest priced](#) | [highest priced](#)

Picture	Item Title	Price	Bids	Time Left
	<a href="#">Lot of hard and floppy drives</a>	\$5.50	2	14m
	<a href="#">Lot of hard and floppy drives</a>	\$5.50	2	22m
	<a href="#">Lot of hard and floppy drives</a>	\$5.50	2	25m
	<a href="#">Lot of 2 hard drives IDE</a>	\$8.00	12	29m
	<a href="#">3.2 gig Hard Drives</a>	\$180.00	-	59m
	<a href="#">(5) 1.2 hard drives &amp; (15) 10/100 network</a>	\$25.00	1	1h 00m
	<a href="#">Lot of 3 Quantum 9.1 gig SCSI Hard Drives</a>	\$26.00	6	1h 25m
	<a href="#">IDE HARD DRIVES (3)</a>	\$6.50	6	1h 46m
	<a href="#">LOT OF 5 Hard Drives! 3.2 Gg Western Digital</a>	\$120.00 \$124.95 <i>7 April Now</i>	-	1h 50m
	<a href="#">QTY 3... IDE Hard Drives 2.5 Gg</a>	\$20.50	5	2h 02m
	<a href="#">5 WESTERN DIGITAL 2.5 GIG HARD DRIVES</a>	\$30.00	4	2h 03m
	<a href="#">QTY 3... IDE Hard Drives 1.0 Gg</a>	\$9.99	1	2h 04m
	<a href="#">Western Digital 850 meg IDE Hard Drives dutch</a>	\$6.00	1	2h 57m
	<a href="#">WINDOWS</a>	\$6.00	-	3h 18m

About 1000 used drives/day sold on eBay.

**Bad news:**

**FORMAT C: doesn't erase the hard drive.**


A screenshot of a Windows command prompt window. The title bar is blue and contains the text 'C:\ C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe - format c:'. The command prompt itself has a black background with white text. It shows the command 'C:\>format c:' being entered. The output of the command is displayed below: 'The type of the file system is NTFS.' followed by a warning: 'WARNING, ALL DATA ON NON-REMOVABLE DISK DRIVE C: WILL BE LOST?' and a prompt: 'Proceed with Format (Y/N)?'.

```
C:\>format c:
The type of the file system is NTFS.

WARNING, ALL DATA ON NON-REMOVABLE DISK
DRIVE C: WILL BE LOST?
Proceed with Format (Y/N)?
```

**FORMAT just writes a new root directory.**

## More bad news: DEL doesn't delete files.



```
C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe

C:\tmp>dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 1410-FC4A

Directory of C:\tmp

10/15/2004  09:20 PM    <DIR>          .
10/15/2004  09:20 PM    <DIR>          ..
10/03/2004  11:34 AM                27,262,976 big_secret.txt
               1 File(s)                27,262,976 bytes
               2 Dir(s)      4,202,078,208 bytes free

C:\tmp>del big_secret.txt

C:\tmp>dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 1410-FC4A

Directory of C:\tmp

10/15/2004  09:22 PM    <DIR>          .
10/15/2004  09:22 PM    <DIR>          ..
               0 File(s)                   0 bytes
               2 Dir(s)      4,229,296,128 bytes free

C:\tmp>_
```

**DEL simply removes the file's name from the directory.**

**Between January 1999 and April 2002,  
I acquired 236 hard drives on the secondary market.**






## Drives arrived by UPS



## Data on drives “imaged” using FreeBSD



```
dd if=/dev/ad0 of=file.img bs=65536 conv=noerror,sync
```



# Images stored on a RAID



## Example: Disk #70: IBM-DALA-3540/81B70E32

Purchased for \$5 from a Mass retail store on eBay

Copied the data off: 541MB

Initial analysis:

Total disk sectors: 1,057,392

Sectors with data: 989,514

Sectors all zero: 67,878


---

Total files: 3

The files:

drwxrwxrwx	0	root	0	Dec	31	1979	./
-r-xr-xr-x	0	root	222390	May	11	1998	IO.SYS
-r-xr-xr-x	0	root	9	May	11	1998	MSDOS.SYS
-rwxrwxrwx	0	root	93880	May	11	1998	COMMAND.COM

**Clearly, this disk had been FORMATED...**



```
C:\>format c:  
The type of the file system is NTFS.  
WARNING, ALL DATA ON NON-REMOVABLE DISK  
DRIVE C: WILL BE LOST!  
Proceed with Format (Y/N)?
```

**Windows FORMAT doesn't erase the disk...  
FORMAT just writes a new root directory.**

## UNIX “strings” reveals the disk’s previous contents...

Insert diskette for drive

and press any key when ready

Your program caused a divide overflow error.

If the problem persists, contact your program vendor.

Windows has disabled direct disk access to protect your lo

To override this protection, see the LOCK /? command for m

The system has been halted. Press Ctrl+Alt+Del to restart

You started your computer with a version of MS-DOS incompat

version of Windows. Insert a Startup diskette matching thi

OEMString = "NCR 14 inch Analog Color Display Enhanced SV

Graphics Mode: 640 x 480 at 72Hz vertical refresh.

XResolution = 640

YResolution = 480

VerticalRefresh = 72



## 70.img con't...

ling the Trial Edition

-----

IBM AntiVirus Trial Edition is a full-function but time-limited evaluation version of the IBM AntiVirus Desktop Edition product. You may have received the Trial Edition on a promotional CD-ROM, a single-file installation program over a network. The Trial Edition is available in seven national languages, and each language is provided on a separate CC-ROM or as a separate installation program.

EAS.STCm

EET.STC

ELR.STCq

ELS.STC

## 70.img con't...

MAB-DEDUCTIBLE

MAB-MOOP

MAB-MOOP-DED

METHIMAZOLE

INSULIN (HUMAN)

COUMARIN ANTICOAGULANTS

CARBAMATE DERIVATIVES

AMANTADINE

MANNITOL

MAPROTILINE

CARBAMAZEPINE

CHLORPHENESIN CARBAMATE

ETHINAMATE

FORMALDEHYDE

MAFENIDE ACETATE

**[Garfinkel & Shelat 03] established the scale of the problem.**

We found:

- Thousands of credit card numbers (many disks)
- Financial records
- Medical information
- Trade secrets
- Highly personal information




**We did not determine why the data had been left behind.**

## There are roughly a dozen documented cases of people purchasing old PCs and finding sensitive data.

- A woman in Pahrump, NV bought a used PC with pharmacy records [Markoff 97]
- Pennsylvania sold PCs with “thousands of files” on state employees [Villano 02]
- Paul McCartney’s bank records sold by his bank [Leyden 04]
- O&O Software GmbH – 200 drives.[O&O 05]



**Information is even left behind on USB drives...**



**A “new” drive contained images from a previous owner.**

## Why don't we hear more stories?


Hypothesis #1: Disclosure of “data passed” is exceedingly rare because most systems are properly cleared.

Hypothesis #2: Disclosures are so common that they are not newsworthy.

Hypothesis #3: Systems aren't properly cleared, but few people notice the data.



## How could people not notice the data?



```
C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe

C:\tmp>dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 1410-FC4A

Directory of C:\tmp

10/15/2004  09:20 PM    <DIR>          .
10/15/2004  09:20 PM    <DIR>          ..
10/03/2004  11:34 AM             27,262,976 big_secret.txt
               1 File(s)              27,262,976 bytes
               2 Dir(s)    4,202,078,208 bytes free

C:\tmp>del big_secret.txt

C:\tmp>dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 1410-FC4A

Directory of C:\tmp

10/15/2004  09:22 PM    <DIR>          .
10/15/2004  09:22 PM    <DIR>          ..
               0 File(s)                0 bytes
               2 Dir(s)    4,229,296,128 bytes free

C:\tmp>_
```

**DEL removes the file's name; doesn't delete the data.**

## Weird Stuff, Sunnyvale California, January 1999

10GB drive: \$19 “tested”

500 MB drive: \$3 “as is”

Q: “How do you sanitize them?”

A: “We FDISK them!”




## **FDISK does not sanitize disks**

**10 GB drive: 20,044,160 sectors**

Command	Sectors Written	%
FORMAT	21,541	0.11%
FDISK	2,563	0.01%


**FORMAT erases the FAT,  
complicating the recovery of fragmented files.**

**Data on a hard drive is arranged in sectors.**




**The white sectors indicate directories and files that are visible to the user.**

**Data on a hard drive is arranged in sectors.**



**The brown sectors indicate files that were deleted.**



**Data on a hard drive is arranged in sectors.**




**The green sectors indicate sectors that were never used (or that were wiped clean).**




# Stack the disk sectors:




**NO DATA: The disk is factory fresh.**




## FORMATTED: The disk has an empty file system




## AFTER OS INSTALL: Temp. files have been deleted




## AFTER A YEAR OF SERVICE



# DISK NEARLY FULL!




## FORMAT C:\ (to sell the computer.)






## We can use forensics to reconstruct motivations:



# The drives are dominated by failed sanitization attempts...



..but training failures are also important.


## Overall numbers

Drives Acquired:	236
Drives DOA:	60
Drives Images:	176
Drives Zeroed:	11
Drives "Clean Formatted:"	22
Total files:	168,459
Total data:	125G

## **Only 33 out of 176 working drives were properly cleared!**

- 1 from Driveguys — but 2 others had lots of data.
- 18 from pcjunkyard — but 7 others had data.
- 1 from a VA reseller — 1 DOA; 3 dirty formats.
- 1 from an unknown source — 1 DOA, 1 dirty format.
- 1 from Mr. M. who sold his 2GB drive on eBay.

**But what *really* happened?**



**I needed to contact the original drive owners.**

# The *Remembrance of Data Passed Traceback Study*. [Garfinkel 05]


1. Find data on hard drive
2. Determine the owner
3. Get contact information for organization
4. Find the right person *inside* the organization
5. Set up interviews
6. Follow guidelines for human subjects work

```
06/19/1999  /:dir216/Four H Resume.doc
03/31/1999  /:dir216/U.M. Markets & Society.doc
08/27/1999  /:dir270/Resume-Deb.doc
03/31/1999  /:dir270/Deb-Marymount Letter.doc
03/31/1999  /:dir270/Links App. Ltr..doc
08/27/1999  /:dir270/Resume=Marymount U..doc
03/31/1999  /:dir270/NCR App. Ltr..doc
03/31/1999  /:dir270/Admissions counselor, NCR.doc
08/27/1999  /:dir270/Resume, Deb.doc
03/31/1999  /:dir270/UMUC App. Ltr..doc
03/31/1999  /:dir270/Ed. Coordinator Ltr..doc
03/31/1999  /:dir270/American College ...doc
04/01/1999  /:dir270/Am. U. Admin. Dir..doc
04/05/1999  /:dir270/IR Unknown Lab.doc
04/06/1999  /:dir270/Admit Slip for Modernism.doc
04/07/1999  /:dir270/Your Honor.doc
```

**This was a lot harder than I thought it would be.**



**Ultimately, I contacted 20 organizations between April 2003 and April 2005.**



## **The leading cause: betrayed trust.**

### **Trust Failure: 5 cases**

- ✓ Home computer; woman's son took to "PC Recycle"
- ✓ Community college; no procedures in place
- ✓ Church in South Dakota; administrator "kind of crazy"
- ✓ Auto dealership; consultant sold drives he "upgraded"
- ✓ Home computer, financial records; same consultant

**This specific failure wasn't considered in [GS 03];  
it was the most common failure.**

## **Second leading cause: Poor training and supervision**

Trust Failure: 5 cases

Lack of Training: 3 cases

- ✓ California electronic manufacturer
- ✓ Supermarket credit-card processing terminal
- ✓ ATM machine from a Chicago bank

**Alignment between the interface and the underlying representation would overcome this problem.**

## **Sometimes the data custodians just don't care.**

Trust Failure: 5 cases

Lack of Training: 3 cases

Lack of Concern: 2 cases

- ✓ Bankrupt Internet software developer
- ✓ Layoffs at a computer magazine

**Regulation on resellers might have prevented these cases.**

## **In seven cases, no cause could be determined.**

Trust Failure: 5 cases

Lack of Training: 3 cases

Lack of Concern: 2 cases

**Unknown Reason: 7 cases**

- ✗ Bankrupt biotech startup
- ✗ Another major electronics manufacturer
- ✗ Primary school principal's office
- ✗ Mail order pharmacy
- ✗ Major telecommunications provider
- ✗ Minnesota food company
- ✗ State Corporation Commission

**Regulation might have helped here, too.**

## Legislative reactions to this research:

### “Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003” (US)


- Introduced in July 2003. Signed December 2003.
- Regulations adopted in 2004, effective June 2005.
- Amends the FCRA to standardize consumer reports.
- Requires destruction of paper or electronic “consumer records.”




**The adopted rules specifically exempt resellers.**



# There are three options for solving this problem.



1. Encrypt stored data.



2. Clear drives before discarding them.




3. Physically destroy drives when discarding.

**Of these options, encryption is the best alternative.**

# Encryption protects protects data against anyone who doesn't have the key

## Options:

- Record-level encryption
- Database encryption
- Encrypted file systems




Apple's File Vault is an easy-to-use encrypted file system.

# Drives can be individually “cleared” before they are repurposed or retired.

## Commercial Software

- Wipe Drive, White Canyon Software.  
<http://www.whitecanyon.com/>
- Blancco Data Cleaner  
<http://www.blancco.com/>



## Free Software:


DBAN

- DBAN  
<http://www.dban.sourceforge.net>

**Wiping an entire drive is easy.  
Selectively wiping is hard.**


## Features to look for in a wiping program:

- Cost: Free? Per copy? Per use?
- Bootable disk?
- Wipe whole drive?
- Wipe slack space?



**Program that wipe slack space can be installed on every desktop.**

**Physical destruction offers the most security.**



**Destruction is the only technique approved for use with classified information.**

# Summary

Information left on hard drives:

- is a serious problem.
- is invisible
- violates Federal law
- is easily address



This is largely the fault of Microsoft, Apple, and Linux.

Destroying this information is your organization's *legal* and *moral* obligation.

## Questions?