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**CSCI E-170**

**October 17, 2005**

**L04: Public Key Cryptography**



# Today's Outline

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1. LJ Nonsense
2. HW2 - Graded and returned.
3. HW3 - How are things going?
4. Review of L03 (hash functions & ciphers)
5. Public Key Cryptography
6. Applications of Public Key



# Nonsense

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Web Server Migration (EECS to Simson.NET)

EECS Mail Outage.

LJ Post-dated entries. Why?



## HW2 - Forensics

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Most of the homeworks were excellent.

What did people learn?

Grades have been sent out.

Outstanding questions?



## HW3 - Crypto

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Posted a few days late. Sorry!  
(We made it easier.)

Due October 24th; web submission

Questions to csci\_e\_170a

<http://www.simson.net/e170/hw3.php>



## HW3 - Hashing Issues 1

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Does MD5 have a key?

Why do we use MD5 and not SHA-1?

It is “safe” to use MD5?

Impact of hash databases



# Google me a hash...

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```
% echo -n "foo" | md5
acbd18db4cc2f85cedef654fccc4a4d8
% echo -n "life" | md5
e155e1bb4a9c38e3baf90637ab7865df
% echo -n "smith" | md5
a66e44736e753d4533746ced572ca821
% echo -n "computer" | md5
df53ca268240ca76670c8566ee54568a
% echo -n "something" | md5
437b930db84b8079c2dd804a71936b5f
% echo -n "else" | md5
2954e92a9b4d0e998fe4893f8141649a
% echo -n "garfinkel" | md5
0c404a59bf8704d0059c0c0f8a2753a4
%
```

**How do you defeat a hash database?**



## Ways of defeating a hash database...

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Salt.

Change the hash algorithm.

Hash bigger things.





## HW3 - Hashing Issues 2

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Think about the difference between these two commands:

```
% echo "foo" | md5sum  
d3b07384d113edec49eaa6238ad5ff00
```

```
% echo -n "foo" | md5sum  
acbd18db4cc2f85cedef654fccc4a4d8
```

What's going on here?



## HW3 - Second Half is Public Key

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Get a certificate.

OpenSSL

Both of these will be explained now....



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# Public Key Algorithms

DH

RSA

Digital Signatures

Certs and Certification



**Public Key: One key seals (encrypted),  
the other key unseals (decrypts)**

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$$M' = f(M, K_1)$$

$$M = f'(M', K_2)$$

**Obvious today; was revolutionary in 1974!**



# Secret Key vs. Public Key


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	<b>secret key</b>	<b>public key</b>
<b>algorithm type</b>	symmetric	asymmetric
<b>basis</b>	substitution and transposition	math
<b>speed</b>	fast	slow
<b>encrypts</b>	blocks of data	numbers
<b>uses</b>	encrypting files	encrypting email



**With symmetric cryptography,  
3 people need 3 keys to communicate.**


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# Five people need 9 keys to communicate.


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**And 1000 people need 499,550 keys to communicate.**

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$$\# \text{ keys} = \frac{(n)(n-1)}{2}$$





## Public key cryptography uses two keys.

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*Public key = seals/encrypts data*

*Private key = unseals/decrypts data*



Whitten's "Metaphor Tailoring."



## Public key cryptography offers several advantages over symmetric cryptography:

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1. Participants can communicate securely without prior arrangement.
  - Secure e-mail. (Alice sends a message to Bob.)
  - Interactively. (Alice and Bob have a phone call.)
2. If public keys can be *published*, then we can have digital signatures.



## Ralph Merkle's Puzzles allowed secure interactive communication in 1974...

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Puzzle  $P(M)$ — takes 1000 minutes to compute  $P^{-1}$  and find  $M$ .

Alice creates keys  $K_1$  through  $K_{1000}$  and sends Puzzles  $P(1, K_1)$  through  $P(1000, K_{1000})$  to Bob in *random order*.

Bob picks  $P(n, K_n)$  at *random*, cracks it, sends  $P(n)$  to Alice.

Time for Alice and Bob to crack:  $1000 \cdot 2$

Time for an observer to crack:  $1000 \cdot 1000$



## **Ralph Merkle figured this out in 1974, but nobody understood it!**

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Reviewers at ACM didn't understand the project!

- “Too far out of the mainstream of cryptography.”
- “Bad science: everybody knows that it is important to keep cryptography keys secret.”

*Communications* finally published the paper in 1978, with an editorial note.



## **Whitfield Diffie & Martin Hellman: A more secure interactive protocol**

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“Multi-User Cryptographic Techniques,” written in fall 1975 for the 1976 National Computer Conference

Proposed the idea of Public Key Cryptography.

May 1976 - Diffie Hellman algorithm invented.

Interactive protocol for 2 participants.



# Diffie Hellman Algorithm

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Relies on the fact that  $g^{ab} \pmod{p} = g^{ba} \pmod{p}$

System Parameters: Prime  $p=23$ , base  $g=5$

Alice and Bob choose secret integers

(Alice  $a=6$ ; Bob  $b=15$ )

Alice computes  $5^a \pmod{p}=8$  and sends to Bob

Bob computes  $5^b \pmod{p}=19$  and sends to Alice

Alice computes  $19^a \pmod{p} = 2$

Bob computes  $8^b \pmod{p} = 2$

2 is the encryption key!



## Problems with Diffie-Hellman (circa 1976)

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Exponential math was slow.

(computers got faster)

DH is an *interactive* protocol.

(Taher ElGamal solved this in 1984)



# The RSA algorithm

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Invented by Rivest, Shamir and Adelman

(Previously invented by Clifford Cocks at GCHQ in '73, but ignored.)

First, Alice and Bob make keys.

Each choose different prime numbers  $p$  &  $q$ ;

compute  $n=pq$

Choose  $e=65$

Compute  $d$  such that  $de=1 \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$

Public key:  $n$  &  $e$

Private key:  $n$  &  $d$





# Using the RSA Algorithm

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Encrypt a message:

$$c = m^e \pmod{n}$$

Decrypt a message:

$$m = c^d \pmod{n}$$

Notice that encryption and decryption are symmetric. This has caused much confusion!



# Padding and RSA

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It is vital to “pad”  $m$  with random prefix and suffix.

$$c = m^e \pmod{n}$$

$$m = c^d \pmod{n}$$

Typical pad:

$$m' = \{\text{rand1}, m, \text{rand2}\}$$

Beware of “raw RSA.”



## **Most public key systems are actually hybrid systems.**

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- Use Diffie-Hellman or RSA to exchange a 128-bit session key
- Use RC2/RC4/AES to encrypt bulk information
- Use certificates to vouch for public keys.



## **Random Numbers are *Very Important* for public key cryptography:**

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### Random Numbers

- Use them to pick your initial public/private key pair.
- Use them for picking session keys

**Come to think of it, they are important for  
symmetric key cryptography too!**



# Sources of Random Numbers

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good	bad
keystroke timing	time of day
packet timing (*)	process ID
radiation, lava lamp	rand(), random()
FM radio	ethernet address
microphone	blocks of CDROMs



**There are many famous cases in which a poor random number compromised security.**

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Early Netscape Navigator  
Kerberos R4 & R5

Is this sequence random: 1, 1, 1, 1, 1 ... ?


<http://www.random.org/> ?

RFC 1750 discusses “best practice” for random numbers. (<http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc1750.html>)



# Digital Signatures

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Encrypt with the *secret* key, decrypt with the *public* key.


Used for verifying that the signer had the private key.

Instead of encrypting the entire Message, we usually encrypt a hash



# Verifying a Digital Signature

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If the hash matches the decrypted signature, the signature verifies!





# Using Digital Signatures

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To sign a digital signature, you need...

- your private key.

To verify a digital signature, you need...

- the other person's public key...

- the name of the algorithm the person has used for the digital signature.



# Certificates bind public keys to identities. [Kohnfelder '78]

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“Simson Garfinkel”  
KeyID 9c309

Signed by KeyCertCo



# Digital Certificates


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Certificates “register”  
public keys

Certificates are signed  
with digital signatures!

Certificates signed by a  
“Certificate Authority”

X.509:



Name  
Organization  
Public Key  
Valid from  
Valid to  
Algorithms  
Other info  
...



Signature from  
Certificate  
Authority



**There are many kinds of X.509(v)3 certificates.**

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Certificate Authorities

User Certificates

Server Certificates

**All of these certificates have the same format, but different purpose.**

Demo: Look at the MacOS certificates with Keychain



# Certificate Authorities issue Certificates, not Keys

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## Process:

- User creates public/private keypair
- User sends Certificate Signing Request (CSR) to the CA.
- CA verifies the sender's identity.
- CA sends the certificate back to the user

The CA's public key must be widely distributed.  
("Download here" doesn't work; why not?)



**DEMO:**

## **Certificate Authorities in Internet Explorer**

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How many can you find?

Who are these companies?

What does their presence mean?



# What good is a Certificate from a CA?

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## In Theory:

- Allows you to “prove your identity” on the Internet. (Age, Sex, Name)
- Allows you to digitally sign documents.
- Allows users to prove “membership” without having to distribute a membership list.

## In practice:

- Allows you to run an SSL server without a warning



## Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs)

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### List of “mistakes?”

- User lost their Private key.
- CA signed the wrong key.
- <http://crl.verisign.com/>

Technically, should be checked whenever a CA cert is trusted.

Most application do not check CRLs. Why not?





# Certs and Keys with OpenSSL

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OpenSSL command-line interface:

- Useful for making keys, certs and CSRs.
- Useful for simple testing
- Useful for converting one format to another (handles PKCS, PEM, and others)
- Useful for testing SSL servers



# Public key systems today

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PGP

S/MIME

SSL, Authenticode.

## Questions to consider:

- How do you make trust decisions understandable and relevant?
- Absolute identity or continuity of identity?
- Why are some of these systems successful but not others?



# OpenSSL Commands

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ca - Certificate Authority Management

ciphers - lists ciphers in your implementation

crl - Manage Certificate Revocation Lists

dgst - calculation of md digests

dsa - Manages DSA algorithm

dsparam - Generate and manage DH keys